The Influence of the Russian Federation’s Historical Policy on the Identity of the Modern Russian Society (ВПЛИВ ІСТОРИЧНОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ РОСІЙСЬКОЇ 

ФЕДЕРАЦІЇ НА ІДЕНТИЧНІСТЬ СУЧАСНОГО

РОСІЙСЬКОГО СУСПІЛЬСТВА) by Moskwa, D. (Москва Д.)
151Серія «Культурологія». Випуск 14. Частина 1.
УДК 32:93
moskwa dagmara
the INflueNce of the ruSSIAN federAtIoN’S 
hIStorIcAl polIcy oN the IdeNtIty  
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Who controls the past controls the future.
Who controls the present controls the past.
George Orwell, »Nineteen Eighty-Four»
The article examines the historical policy of the Russian Federation 
during the Vladimir Putin’s (7.V.2000 – 7.V.2008) and Dmitry Medvedev’s 
presidency (7.V.2008 – 7.V.2012). It investigates how the historical policy 
influences the modern Russian’s perception of the past, their national 
identity and functioning in a society. This paper explores period from 2000 
to 2012, because of its great importance. Just then the authorities, centred 
around the Russian President, have changed their attitude to using of the 
past in achieving political and social goals.
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ВПЛИВ ІСТОРИЧНОЇ ПОЛІТИКИ РОСІйСЬКОЇ 
ФЕДЕРАЦІЇ НА ІДЕНТИЧНІСТЬ СУЧАСНОГО 
РОСІйСЬКОГО СУСПІЛЬСТВА
У статті проведено аналіз історичної політики Російської Феде-
рації протягом президентства Володимира Путіна (7.05.2000 – 
7.05.2008 рр.) та Дмитра Медведєва (7.05.2008 – 7.05.2012). Автор 
досліджує, як історична політика впливає на сприйняття сучасниими 
росіянами минулого, своєї національної ідентичності і функціонування 
в суспільстві. У цій статті розглядається період з 2000 по 2012 рік 
з огляду на його велике значення. Саме тоді влада, яка зосереджена 
навколо Президента Російської Федерації, змінила своє ставлення до 
використання минулого для досягнення політичних і соціальних цілей. 
Ключові слова: Росія, історична політика, колективна пам’ять, 
Володимир Путін, Дмитро Медведєв.
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ВЛИяНИЕ ИСТОРИЧЕСКОй ПОЛИТИКИ 
РОССИйСКОй ФЕДЕРАЦИИ НА ИДЕНТИЧНОСТЬ 
СОВРЕМЕННОГО РОССИйСКОГО ОБщЕСТВА
В статье проанализирована историческая политики Российской 
Федерации на протяжении президентства Владимира Путина 
(7.05.2000 – 7.05.2008 рр.) и Дмитрия Медведева (7.05.2008 – 7.05.2012). 
Автор исследует то, каким образом историческая политика влияет на 
восприятие современными россиянами прошлого, своей идентичности 
и функционирования в обществе. В этой статье рассмотрен период с 
2000 по 2012 год, поскольку он имеет большое значение. Именно тог-
да власть, которая сконцентрирована вокруг Президента Российской 
Федерации, изменила свое отношение к использованию прошлого для 
достижения политических и социальных целей.
Ключевые слова: Россия, историческая политика, коллективная 
память, Владимир Путин, Дмитрий Медведев.
Introduction
At the beginning, I would like to make a few observations related 
to the terminology presented in the text. The study of historical policy 
is a serious challenge which – very often – has negative associations 
especially among historians (but not only). The basic term included 
herein – historical policy – appears as (quoting after a historian Alexei 
Miller) an interpretation of the history by the political institutions and 
attempts to convince the public to the truth of this interpretation in 
order to achieve some goals [1, p. 13–17]. Moreover, the historical 
policy shaped by the Russian authorities can be defined as a ‘conquest 
policy’. It means that the ruling elites impose on the society their own 
history interpretation and core values such as patriotism and pride of 
homeland [2, p. 56].
Another crucial term (if not even more important in that case) 
is collective memory. It is used by Polish sociologists, for instance 
Barbara Szacka [3] (who quotes after a French sociologist, Maurice 
Halbwachs [4]) and Andrzej Szpociński [5]. I would like to emphasize 
that not all of the researchers understand the collective memory in 
the same way. Some of them use terms such as ‘cultural memory’ 
(introduced by a German Egyptologist, Jan Assmann [6]) and ‘places 
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of memory’ (created by a French historian, Pierre Nora [7]). This text 
makes explicit reference to Szacka, who understands the collective 
memory as:
The ideas of the past of our community constructed by 
some individuals from saved or not (...) information coming 
from various sources (...). They are understood, selected and 
transformed according to our cultural standards and beliefs. 
The standards are created by the society, so they are common 
to the members of the community. It makes the past images 
uniform and helps to talk about the collective memory of the 
group [3, p.44].
In the context of the collective memory of Russians, very important 
is also to the concept of a cultural memory in the meaning created by 
the aforementioned Jan Assmann. As he stresses, it refers mainly to 
the rituals:
If the routine activities achieve the status of ritual and – 
besides the practical function – become general, they will 
be outside the mimetic memory. The rituals belong to the 
sphere of cultural memory, because they hand down essential 
traditional values and meanings (...). Cultural memory has 
more sacred, symbolic and abstract nature. For this reason, 
cultural memory cannot be created by the individuals, their 
role have to take over the highly organized institutions [6, 
p. 36-67].
In case of Russia, the most important ‘organized institutions’ are 
the state­run ones, responsible for shaping ‘the only true’ conception 
of the past.
The historical policy (especially this one launched by Russian 
state­run institutions) has more in common with the collective memory 
than with history in general. In my opinion, we can consider them as 
two different kind of knowledge of the past. Following Szacka [3, 
p. 30], collective memory and history should be considered as two 
separate models with various representations of the past (including 
the historical policy) located between them. 
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Both Assmann and Szacka emphasize that the events, people 
and processes from the past are selected by some institutions, 
organizations or people (subjects which could influence a memory 
of the community by consolidating beneficial for them interpretation 
of the past events or processes). What is more, there is not only 
a selection of information, but also a modification of its sources. As a 
result, new social consciousness of the past (often incompatible with 
a reality) is arisen and can be used to achieve social or political goals 
[8, p. 15­16].
collective memory and national identity
Using the identity [9, p. 63­78] we are able to understand and 
organize some phenomena concerning individuals and the community. 
Moreover, it helps us to indicate the similarities and differences in 
understanding ourselves and the others. The identity enables us to 
divide the individuals into ‘me’ and ‘he’/‘she’, ‘we’ and ’they’, and 
to answer the question ‘Who am I?’/’Who are we?’ and ‘Who do 
I/we want to be?’ [10, p. 12]. A national identity is a result of the 
nation­building process. What’s more, the social factors (including a 
tradition, myths, and a way of the past understanding) influence the 
identity of every single generation [11, p. 57].
How people live today determines how they perceive the 
past and what they see in it [12, p. 45].
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the Soviet Union) 
ceased to exist in December 1991. From this period, Russia witnessed 
an ideological gap after a collapse of the Communism. The Russian 
people had to develop their new national identity. The division into 
‘us’ and ‘they’ – a de facto basic element of an identity – became 
plainly visible then [13, p. 17]. And even today this division leads 
to many political, economic, cultural and ethnic problems (ethnic 
disturbances, xenophobic feelings etc.) [14].
One of the most important functions of the collective memory 
is an identity one. A way of understanding the past is essential for 
identifying ‘who am I’ and ‘who I want to be’ (we are the heirs 
and followers of our ancestors). Moreover, a memory is a mean of 
conveying social and behaviour patterns:
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In the context of the collective memory any figures and past 
events do not have a neutral nature. Quite the opposite, they 
have unambiguously moral character, either good or bad, and 
that is why they are venerated or condemned. There is no place 
for an indifference [15, p. 48-50].
It is crucial to emphasise that there can be seen also changes of 
historical heroes, processes and the past events (they become symbols 
like for example the soldiers fighting during the Great Patriotic War 
– a symbol of heroism and tragic death) [3, p. 48­50, 54­57]. So the 
memory leads to social integration and consolidation of the society 
(often used by the Russian authorities).
the characteristic features  
of russia’s historical policy from 2000 to 2012
When Putin took an office as a Russian President (2000­2004, 
2004­2008), a strong concentration of power took place in the 
country. It has led to the intensification of the authoritarian tendencies 
(restriction of the social control over the policy implementig by the 
authorities, manual control of internal policy etc.) [16, p. 31­32]. At 
that time, a historical rhetoric appealed to the Russian Empire and 
the Soviet Union [17, p. 2­3]. There was a return to the Soviet Union 
ideas in some way – rehabilitation and glorification of the superpower 
policy of the Soviet empire, Russia as the besieged fortress etc. There 
was also the theme of the enemy outside the country (the West) and 
inside the country (the opposition or Islamic extremist groups). The 
main goal was to consolidate the society around the guaranteeing 
safety and peace authorities [18, p. 17].
From the beginning of Medvedev’s tenure (2008­2012), the 
distinct changes could be seen in Russia’s historical policy (the 
most active supporter of them was Medvedev himself). The most 
significant one was to give up Stalin’s apology. The symbols of this 
turning point were the main politicians’ statements, the celebration 
of national holidays (e.g. The Katyn Massacre on 7 April – the then 
Prime Minister Putin condemned the Stalinist repression – or the 
Victory Day on 9 May) and a media campaign. Also, it was constantly 
emphasized that the Soviet Union had key part during World War II 
– the superpower which saved the European countries from Nazism 
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[19, p. 2­3]. However, Medvedev’s decisions differed significantly 
from declarations – the commission was set up by a decree issued 
by Medvedev in May 2009 officially to defend Russia against the 
falsification of its history. De facto however, the commission dealt 
mainly with fending off criticism of the Soviet Union [20, p. 6].
The historical policy has been changed during Medvedev’s 
presidency. New rules have been introduced to create an image of 
Russia as a powerful country in Europe especially in a sphere of 
security (emphasising the Soviet Union’s major part in the World War 
II were to legitimize Moscow’s aspirations to play a greater role in the 
European security). The aim of imposing new rules should also make 
an achieving of the political and economic goals easier. Moreover, it 
should convince the sceptical member countries of the European Union 
about the chances to cooperate more closely with Russia. World War 
II victory is presented as a result of the Soviet people joined forces. 
Thus it could strengthen the Community in Post­Soviet Societies and 
justify Russia’s leading role in this area. When Medvedev took an 
office as President, Russia witnessed a separation the Soviet Union 
position in World War II from its assessment of political system and 
the participation in the post­war order creating. The President admitted 
the Soviet Union was a totalitarian state and described Katyn massacre 
as an example of distorting history [19, p. 2­3]. 
There is one fundamental myth which is a part of national 
identity in Russia – a victory in the Great Patriotic War. This myth is 
especially aimed at strengthening the legitimization of the authorities 
and consolidation the society. It also stressed the Soviet soldiers’ 
heroism (the beginning of World War II dates when Hitler broke the 
pact between the Soviet Union and the Nazi Germany and invaded 
the Soviet Union in 1941). Joseph Stalin is presented as a powerful 
communist leader but there was nothing said about Communist 
crimes for a long time.
The most important government activities in the field of historical 
policy are [21]:
– politicians speeches during celebrating anniversaries of 
significant events of the past (e.g. the Victory Day) and their definite 
stands presented in the international arena. The calendar of national 
holidays has an incredible impact on the society and its feelings 
(celebrations are to commemorate certain episodes and heroes of the 
past);
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– institutions activity aimed at conducting the historical 
propaganda operations (e.g. the History Commission of Russia – 
formally, the Presidential Commission of the Russian Federation 
to Counter Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s 
Interests) [16, p. 3];
– regulations in the most essential national policy documents 
(including The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 
2013 [22]).
The main goals of a correction of the Russian Federation’s 
historical policy within its borders include the need to prove Russia’s 
power in the international arena and consolidate Russian society 
around the authority by a sense of national pride and an information 
policy conducted in state­owned media [17, p.3]. What is more, 
official historical policy connected with a president office is aimed at 
giving the society official history version in order to make them loyal 
to the country. The notion about the past, created by the authorities, 
is very often misconceived and simply wrong. However, it seems 
that the Russian people have nothing against it. The truth is that the 
ambitions to become a world superpower and a desire to rule the 
country with a rod of iron are deeply ingrained in Russian political 
culture [23, p. 21]. And there is only a small chance to change this 
situation in the nearest future [24].
Summary
Do the state authorities have the right to interfere in the 
interpretation of the past? Or should it evolve in a free marketplace 
of ideas? In my opinion, the authorities should indicate the way of 
understanding the past and leave the society a possibility to draw their 
own conclusion about the past.
On the one hand, historical policy can be used as a political 
weapon to discredit political rivals but on the other hand to integrity 
the society around the authority. There is no coherence between 
the authorities and the society in Russia (not only in the field of 
interpreting the past), so there is no approval from ruled to the rulers 
[25]. That is why the efforts are made to convince the public opinion 
that the political institutions have the only right to create ‘the only 
true’ vision of the past.
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The truth is that every state has its own politics of memory. The 
authorities often show history in a distorting mirror – there must be 
the conformity of the past to its official interpretation. But it is a norm 
in history to seek objectivity, which implies discussing different 
options. As Norman Davies said:
Historical propaganda, either good or bad, is an inherent 
problem in history. It is a struggle for a knowledge. But a 
historian is never able to remain independent or objective 
(...). If historical propaganda accompanies us forever and 
every political system has it, then must be someone to correct 
political platitudes. And this is, inter alia, a task for every 
historian [26, p. 81-83].
This paper was inspired by the author’s research conducted in 
connection with a Phd dissertation on the historical policy of the 
Russian Federation.
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